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Drawing on Anderson’s (2010) identiﬁcation of calculative, imaginative and performative modes of
anticipatory action where futures are made present in the present day, this article explores how rural
studies have explored futures before focusing its attention on the degree to which residents in four
villages in England make evaluations of rural futures linked to issues of low carbon lifestyles and climate
change. Particular attention is paid to the role of imaginative constructions of rurality in inﬂuencing
anticipatory actions associated with carbon dependency and climate change. The study reveals the
presence of disjunctures between expressed concerns over energy consumption and climate change, and
associated mitigative and adaptive actions. It is noted that such disjunctures have been widely observed
in previous studies and interpreted through some variant of a ‘deﬁcit model of public understanding’. It is
argued, however, that such models ignore the presence of cultural and material constraints on action, the
presence of pre-existing imaginative and performative interpretations of futures, and the degree to
which people are aware of such disjunctures and construct narratives for the self that seek to resolve,
deny or displace dissonances between beliefs and actions. The paper outlines ﬁve narratives that pro-
mote stasis as well as three narratives of transition, considering how they make a range of futures both
present and absent.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
“peak oil is but one of the crises humanity will encounter over
the coming 20e50 years. Solutions to any of these problems,
taken in isolation, might well exacerbate others. For example,
a technologically-optimistic reading would suggest that long
term price rises associated with peak oil might well make
currently uneconomic petrochemical resources like tar sands
exploitable, given existing or in-the-pipeline technologies, .
But we cannot afford to release the carbon locked up in high
emission alternatives like tar sands, . Greater use of biofuels
will lead to food shortages”
North, 2010, p. 586
“I . argue for a ‘resource turn’ in sociology, whereby societies
should be examined through the patterns, scale and character of
their resource-dependence and resource-consequences. Rather.
r Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.than a Post-Fordist or post-modern sociology, a post-carbon
sociology is elaborated. This emphasises how modernity has
consisted of an essentially carbonised world, but that this car-
bonisation has been obscured and ignored by most social
thought. Such social thought, we might say, was carbon blind,
never interrogating the resource and energy bases of economic
life. I seek nothing less than the development of a post-carbon
sociology and, much more importantly, a post-carbon society”
Urry, 2011, p. 16
“The politics of climate change has to cope with what I call
‘Giddens’s paradox’. It states that, since the dangers posed by
global warming aren’t tangible, immediate or visible in the
course of day-to-day life, however awesome they appear, many
will sit on their hands and do nothing of a concrete nature about
them. Yet waiting until they become visible and acute before
being stirred to serious action will, by deﬁnition, be too late”
Giddens, 2009, p. 2
These three quotes set the context for this paper, which explores
the degree to which rural life in England, and indeed elsewhere,
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reliance on carbon-based energy and the degree to which people in
these communities are willing to accept or even recognise these
challenges, or whether, in part because of prevailing imagined ge-
ographies of rurality, they are likely to undertake few of the tran-
sitional activities required to address them.
Recent expansion in the use of production techniques such as
fracking has thrown doubt on the calculative predictions associated
with concepts such as peak-oil and post-carbon societies (see
Chapman, 2014). However, the claims of North about the inter-
locking character of contemporary challenges is clearly evidenced
in both contemporary resistance to the employment of such tech-
niques, which have often sought to highlight how they may
adversely impact onwater and other environmental resources, and
by calculative predictions concerning the continued growth of
carbon consumption and the impacts of its combustion on climatic
conditions (e.g. see Verbruggen and Al Marchohi, 2010). As a
consequence, for many people the notion of a transition towards a
low carbon future is as signiﬁcant, pressing and challenging as ever,
not least because, as highlighted by Giddens’ self-entitled paradox,
people may remain resistant to actions that could realise such a
future until a point in time whereby such a future cannot be
attained. In a sense, therefore, the future is both a very active
presence for some peoplee as Brown et al. (2012, p. 1607) note, the
term ‘transition’ often “implies a pressing sense of temporality” e
but for many others such a future may be a presence that they
prefer to keep absent from their everyday consciousness.
Anderson and Adey (2012, p. 1529) have recently claimed that
the present time is a “geohistorical moment” in which questions
over the future overshadow events in the present. The folding of
the future into the present is, they suggest, an issue that warrants
detailed empirical investigation, not least because it is achieved
through a range of modes of practices, has signiﬁcant effects on the
present, and is “folded into the making of subjects in the present”.
As Brown et al. (2012, p. 1608) have noted, such practices can be
clearly discerned in relation to notions of transition, which has
become a term deployed “in policy discourses, everyday lives, and
socio-scientiﬁc research”. This deployment, they suggest, has sig-
niﬁcant impacts in the present and on the future, acting, for
instance, to draw “together diverse groups, ideologies, and visions
of the future” (p. 1619) in away that is open to change but also quite
conservative in that much of the future is constructed as a
continuation of the present. They further suggest that notions of
transition often imply compulsion in the sense of “a mode of af-
fective governance that uses barely spoken inevitable threats in
order to rewire the psyche of individuals and communities” (Brown
et al., 2012, p. 1619). One might add that such affective modes of
governance may well be resisted and that social integration does
not necessarily have to be achieved through affective governance:
even those who might be sceptical of futures associated with no-
tions such as post-carbon and climate change may well be affected
through the actions of people and agencies that have come to
orientate their actions to avoid, adapt to or align with such futures.
The present paper seeks to illustrate the signiﬁcance of such
arguments, which have hitherto been largely absent from rural
studies, by drawing on a research project conducted as part of
Research Council UK’s Rural Economy and Land Use (RELU) pro-
gramme.1 This research investigated how people in rural commu-
nities respond to issues of climate change mitigation and1 Further details of the programme are available at www.relu.ac.uk. This work
was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number RES-
240-25-0025], with the project being entitled ‘Adaptations to rural communities
through living with climate change’.adaptation, focusing on four rural villages located in three con-
trasting English rural districts: East Lindsey, Harborough and West
Berkshire (see Fig. 1). These districts were chosen to reﬂect some of
the diversity or differentiation of rural England, being, for example,
local authority Districts respectively classiﬁed as ‘deep rural’,
‘transient rural’ and ‘dynamic commuter’ in the classiﬁcation
created by the ‘Rural Futures’ project commissioned by Defra (see
Future Foundation, 2002; Lowe and Ward, 2009, Table 1).
This classiﬁcation was created as a base-line from which pro-
jective scenarios of rural futures could be created (Future
Foundation, 2002; Lowe and Ward, 2009). As such it represented
an instance of the long-running, albeit far from extensive, series of
rural studies that exhibit some explicit future orientation (other
examples include Coughenous and Busch,1978; Blunden and Curry,
1985; Lockhart and Ilbery, 1987; Marsden, 1999; Countryside
Agency, 2003; Dockerty et al., 2006; Future Foundation, 2006;
Amcoff and Westholm, 2007; Moseley and Owen, 2008; Soliva
et al., 2008; Shucksmith, 2012). For Ray and Ward (2006) the
growth of these studies in the mid-1990s reﬂected governmental
requirements for risk management and the ‘engineering’ of public
discourses, along with a neoliberal ‘modernisation imperative’
which sought to reconﬁgure both governance and rurality, with the
latter being increasingly viewed as “in large part, an outcome or
artefact of the forces of change inwider society” (p. 4). Rather more
generally, Anderson (2010, p. 777) has argued that “acting in
advance of the future is an integral, yet taken-for-granted, part of
liberal-democratic life”. He adds, that such ‘anticipatory action’ has
often been relatively ignored in academic studies, although sug-
gests that there are at least three ‘modes of practice’ through which
futures are made present in the present: the calculative, the
imaginative and the performative.2 This paper will outline these
three modes relating them to the study of rural futures before
focusing attention on the imaginative one, detailing how rural
residents were able to fabricate visions of the future of their place of
residence and whether these did, or did not, imply change from the
present. Attention is then paid to exploring the explanations, or
narratives, given by people as to the degree to which they could
foresee transition or non-transition. The paper concludes by brieﬂy
considering the signiﬁcance of the study to attempts at fostering
transitions to rural low carbon futures.
2. Modes of practicing rural futures in the present
2.1. The calculative: calculating probable/plausible rural futures
The ﬁrst mode of practice identiﬁed by Anderson is ‘calculation’,
which he identiﬁes as the making present of futures “through the
domain of numbers”. Such a mode of practice is enacted in many of
the rural future texts cited previously, which make use of a series of
empirical-analytical analysis techniques based onmeasurements of
some present and/or past extrapolated into the future through use
of some form of trend analysis (such as linear, non-linear or sto-
chastic modelling). Such an approach is clearly evidenced in the
Defra commissioned Rural Futures project, which made use of a
Monte Carlo simulation techniques to propose ‘probable futures’
based on the variables used to construct the typology of contem-
porary rural areas (see Lowe and Ward, 2009; for details). The use
of the phrase ‘probable futures’ is, as Gidley et al. (2009) note,
widespread amongst such empirical-analytical approaches, as
indeed is ‘plausible futures’ (see Fish, 2005). Both phrases, however,2 Anderson also identiﬁes styles and logics as part of his ‘conceptual vocabulary’
for understanding anticipatory actions, but for the present purpose his identiﬁca-
tion of practices is deemed to sufﬁce.
Fig. 1. Location of case study Districts.
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future; seeing the future as being, in large part, the product of
existing presences in that they reﬂect the same dynamics as the
past and present, rather than seeking out possibilities for being
different and challenging existing states of affairs. Fish (2005), for
example, suggests that the Countryside Agency’s (2003) use of the
notion of plausibility in its State of the Countryside Report 2020 is as
"another way of saying acceptability: acceptability to what already
is in place; acceptability to the prevailing order of things; accept-
ability to a priori assumptions about the inexorable nature and
direction of change”.
Such approaches cannot only be criticised from a critical social
science perspective as reproducing existing relations of domination
and inequality, but have also been critiqued from natural science
perspectives for failing to recognise the irreversibility of some
forms of change, with notions such as ‘tipping points’ being
increasingly used to suggest that the future could be “radically
different from the here and now” (Anderson, 2010, p. 780). To
counteract such criticisms, some future studies have sought to
develop ‘alternative’ as opposed to ‘probable’ or ‘plausible’ sce-
narios, although the latter are often retained in some form (see
Haines-Young et al., 2010). Within such alternative perspectives,
use is often made of Anderson’s second mode of practice, ‘imagi-
nation’, which he describes as involving “practices based on crea-
tive fabulation” (Anderson, 2010, p. 784).
2.2. The imaginative: fabulating alternative rural futures
Anderson does not detail precisely what he means by the term
creative fabulation, save for suggesting that its practices include
“techniques such as visioning, future-basing, link analysis and
scenario building” which create “affectively imbued representa-
tions that move and mobilize” (Anderson, 2010, p. 784-5).
The employment of such techniques is evident in work on rural
futures, including the aforementioned Rural Futures project, which
illustrated at least three techniques for imaging futures. First, itused images to represent the outcomes of the statistical analyses of
both current and future states of the countryside (see Fig. 2), a
practice that seeks to harness together practices of calculation and
imagination. Secondly, these images were presented as part of an
exercise in storytelling, being used to illustrate a set of scenarios
that were described as “a way of telling stories about the future”
(Future Foundation, 2002). Third, the images and narratives were
promoted as artefacts in on-going processes that can yield as yet
unthought-of futures, by presenting alternative stimuli for thought,
discussion and thereafter action that serves as an “intervention on
the future” (Anderson, 2010, p. 785).
The degree to which scenarios live up to the third descriptor can
be questioned. Reference has already beenmade to Fish’s critique of
the Countryside Agency’s State of the Countryside Report 2020,
which not only argued that the report’s ‘alternative futures’ were
limited through the emphasis given to plausibility, but also via
expectations of future users and uses of these scenarios, such that
they become foreshadowed by expectations as to ‘preferred fu-
tures’. These scenarios might hence be viewed as ‘normative’, even
if not as explicitly as those created through techniques such as
backcasting (see Fish, 2005).
Gidley et al. (2009) suggest that alternative as opposed to
normative preferred scenarios can be constructed through what
they term ‘cultural-interpretive’ approaches. In examining these it is
useful to note that the term fabulation, used by Anderson, has
circulated in discussions of science ﬁction, utopian, post-structural
and feminist ﬁction writings where it has been used to refer to
imaginings ofworlds that are structured inways that are ‘other’ than
the present world (e.g. see Scholes, 1975; Barr, 1987, 1994; Deleuze
and Guattari, 1994; Bogue, 2010). These fabulations seek to make
present things that are absent from an existingworld. They could be
entirely imagined or be, and in practice arguably more often are,
drawn from other places or situations. Gidley et al. (2009), for
example, suggest that the ‘cultural interpretive’ approach to sce-
nario building explores alternative futures through engagements
with ‘non-Western’ cultures, an approach that could potentially
Table 1
Rural character of case study Districts.
District Rural futures
area classiﬁcation
Key features as identiﬁed in Lowe and Ward (2009)
East Lindsey Deep rural Areas that “resonate most closely with popular perceptions of the ‘traditional’ countryside” (Lowe and Ward, 2009, p., 1324).
Agriculture still seen as major component of the local economy, often alongside tourism. Limited in-migration or commuting
and relatively poor infrastructure and spatial connectivity.
Harbrough Transient rural Described as lacking in the “the energizing commuting systems” of the ‘dynamic commuter’ zones and the “prominent
agricultural sector” of the ‘deep rural areas’, although having above-average levels of commuting centred on nearby
‘provincial centres’ and at least retaining current levels of population (p. 1325).
West Berkshire Dynamic
commuter
Areas seen to exhibit socio-economic dynamism and large numbers of commuters, some travelling considerable
distances. Areas exhibit a ‘de-localization’ of residents’ life-worlds “driven by afﬂuence and lifestyle choice” with
residents tending to be “well-connected into networks of power and inﬂuence” (p. 1323).
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non- or more than human perspectives (see Bogue, 2010).
Whilst such perspectives have all been explored within rural
studies (e.g. Wynne, 1996; Kearns, 1997; McClean et al., 1997; Gullo
et al., 1998; Suchet, 2002; Jones, 2006; Halfacree, 2006, 2007;
Panelli et al., 2008; Riley, 2008; Pickerill, 2008; Morris, 2010),
they are rarely linked to notions of the future. One notable excep-
tion to this is Halfacree’s (2006; 2007) attempt to add consideration
of ‘radical ruralities’ into models of emergent post-productivist
countrysides. In accordance with the notion of fabulations as
worlds structured in other ways, Halfacree (2007, p. 131) deﬁnes
radical ruralities as attempts to “take rural development in a
fundamentally different direction to that which dominates today”.
He adds that such ‘radical ruralities’ can take many forms, or “sub-
species”, before focusing attention on what he describes as “argu-
ably the most signiﬁcant”, which he characterises as “green ‘radical
rurality’” that draws on,
“the established and deep foundational wells of communism
and, most of all, anarchism .but is most clearly manifested in
such things as ‘direct action’-orientated ‘green’ politics. [and]
has links with. ‘constructive’ green politics . [ranging from]
. ecological citizenship that foregrounds the search for ‘sus-
tainability’, . anti-capitalist economics, to celebratory state-
ments such as Notes fromNowhere’s (2003)We are Everywhere”
Halfacree, 2007, p. 131
Fabulations of the future in the sense of imaginings of worlds
structured inways other than the present can be quite central to the
lines of thought identiﬁed by Halfacree, with rurality ﬁguring
prominently within many of them. Anarchists writings such as
Kropotkin’s (1899) Fields, Factories and Workshops Tomorrow, for
example, promoted the future value of small, low density settle-
ments with seemingly organic and localised relationships with the
land and nature, as has more recent ecological and alternative-
living texts such as Goldsmith et al.’s (1972) Blueprint for Survival
and Simon Fairlie’s (1996) Low impact development. It is, however,
noticeable that such studies and associated imaginings fail to ﬁgure
within the range of ‘alternative scenarios’ being considered in most
rural future studies. As Halfacree (2006, p. 312) argues, at the very
least their inclusion would “extend the scope of rural possibilities”
within deliberations over what sorts of rural future could be
possible, as well as potentially acting to “critique forms of rural
space that are emerging”.33 There are interesting parallels between Halfacree’s identiﬁcation of green
radical rurality and Cruickshank’s (2009) identiﬁcation of mental and material
‘alternative rurality’ in Norway, although Cruickshank, and also Winther and
Svendsen (2012), emphasises the integration of these ruralities with modernisa-
tion perspectives rather than the extent to which they might open out alternative
futures.Anderson’s use of the term fabulation can hence be interpreted
as providing an avenue for not only exploring the anticipatory
practices of specialist ‘futurologists’, who in many instances can be
seen as creating normative ‘preferred futures’ that are still very
much tied to existing presences, but as also pointing to absences in
the mainstream accounts of the present that appear in a range of
alternative imaginings, such as those encompassed in Halfacree’s
description of radical ruralities. Anderson himself focuses his dis-
cussions on specialist futurologists, but the signiﬁcance of
including alternative futures can be seen in the scenarios created by
John Urry and co-workers in relation to climate change and the
emergence of post-carbon societies. Both ‘After the car’ (Dennis and
Urry, 2009) and ‘Climate change and society’ (Urry, 2011) include a
‘local sustainability scenario’, which is explicitly visualized as rep-
resenting “what many environmentalists argue for” and encom-
passes, amongst other features, “a network of self-reliant (and
probably also semi-isolated) communities in which people live,
work and mostly recreate” (Dennis and Urry, 2009, p. 149). Such a
scenario is signiﬁcantly different to the alternatives presented in,
for example, the State of the Countryside Report 2020 and the Rural
Futures project. Interestingly the former report included very
limited reference to climate change, carbon emissions or energy
supplies, whilst in the latter it was far from the principal driver of
scenario construction. By contrast, in the works of Urry and co-
workers, these factors are viewed as central social challenges to
the future.
A third perspective on fabulation is that the term could
encompass more mundane, routinized anticipatory imaginings
connected to the performance of everyday life. As will be discussed
in the next section, the signiﬁcance of such assessments has been
highlighted by work on public assessments of climate change and
associated actions to reduce dependency on carbon based sources
of energy and raw materials. Although this work can be seen to
demonstrate the signiﬁcance of both imaginative and performative
modes of anticipatory action, much of it has emerged from studies
adopting a calculative perspective. The next section will explore
this movement, focusing in particular on its relevance to studies of
rural futures.
2.3. The performative: climate and energy futures e from
calculations and imaginings through to performance
The lack of reference to climate change and energy issues in
reports such as State of the Countryside Report 2020 and those
related to the Rural Futures project can be seen to reveal how as-
sessments of the future are conditioned by the concerns of a
particular present: as Whitmarsh (2011, p. 690) has observed, the
ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century has seen “a striking degree
of scientiﬁc agreement” about the “human inﬂuence on climate and
the signiﬁcant risks posed by climate change for humans and non-
human life”; an explicit acceptance by policy actors in at least some
countries about the need to “curb greenhouse gas emissions”; and
Fig. 2. Representations of present and future countryside: images from the Rural Futures Project. Source: Future Foundations (2002) Scenario building for twenty year and ﬁfty year
futures Department for Environment Food Rural Affairs, London.
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tries that climate change is an issue of future concern and
contemporary action. As yet there have been few studies that have
sought to examine the spatiality of such concern with respect to its
rurality or urbanity: two recent surveys of public attitudes towards
climate change in the UK, for example, make no reference at all to
the possibility of geographical variability (Upham et al., 2009;
Spence et al., 2010), although a series of localised studies have
posited potential reasons for both heightened and lower levels of
climate change concern amongst rural residents (e.g. Davidson
et al., 2003; Buys et al., 2012; Reser et al., 2012). On the other
hand, it is clear that calculative assessments of the contributions
that rural areas/populations may make to future climate changes
are more widely made and have been drawn into public policy
making.
The Commission for Rural Communities, for example, began to
include increasingly complex calculations in its State of theCountryside Reports concerning the contributions that rural areas
were making to greenhouse gas emissions, suggesting in its ﬁnal
report prior to abolition, that rural England was already experi-
encing climatic changes and that per capita greenhouse gas emis-
sions were 8 per cent higher than in urban districts, with the
difference being even greater in relation to transport where emis-
sions were 26 per cent higher (Commission for Rural Communities,
2010; Fahmy et al., 2011). This situation is seen, in part, to reﬂect
rural travel patterns, it being calculated that people living in areas
classiﬁed as ‘Villages’ or ‘Hamlets and Isolated Dwellings’ travelled
42 per cent further than those in England as a whole (see also
Anable et al., 1997, p. v). It was also calculated that people generated
as much greenhouse gas emissions in relation to living within their
homes as they do through travel (Commission for Rural
Communities, 2010), with per capita emissions again being
higher in rural areas than urban ones. These urban/rural differences
are linked to the presence of larger proportions of ‘hard to heat’ and
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number of old properties with solid walls whose insulation prop-
erties are less than thosewith cavity insulation and cannot be easily
improved (BRE Housing, 2008). State of the Countryside Reports, for
example, have repeatedly demonstrated that per capita domestic
energy consumption is higher in rural areas than urban ones,
although they also importantly caution that there may be cross-
correlation between rurality and spatial variations in socio-
economic variables such as social class, income, housing form and
tenure, and levels of car ownership (Commission for Rural
Communities, 2007; Department for Environment Food and Rural
Affairs (Defra), 2008b).4 Attention is also drawn in these reports
to calculations of fuel poverty that suggest that this impacts a
higher proportion of households in some rural areas than it does
urban households in the same region, in part due to large numbers
of ‘hard to heat’/‘hard to treat’ properties, low levels of pay in some
rural businesses, and because many householders are not con-
nected to the gas network and are reliant on other, often higher
cost, fuels (Commission for Rural Communities, 2007, 2008, 2010;
see also Preston et al., 2013).
Some rural studies have explored the imaginative and indeed
performative modes of practice associated with climate change. For
instance, work by Geoghegan and Leyshon on the Lizard Peninsula
in Cornwall, England (Geoghegan and Leyshon, 2012; Leyshon and
Geoghegan, 2012; Brace and Geoghegan, 2011), has sought to un-
derstand what climate change, or as they prefer to term it, “climate
and the ways it may change” or even “weather variability”
(Geoghegan and Leyshon, 2012, p. 57, 59), means to people within
the course of their everyday lives. They recognise that complex
calculative mechanisms of climate forecasting and projections of
change have been established and are routinely ‘translated’ by
people into the performance of their everyday lives (see Holloway,
1999), but suggest that these ‘expert knowledges’ are ‘stalked’ by
“inconsistencies and ambiguities” (Brace and Geoghegan, 2011, p.
285) and that there are ‘local knowledges’ of climate constructed
through everyday encounters. These two points are also made
more generally by Hulme (2008, p. 7) who argues that climate
needs to be seen as “an imaginative idea, an idea constructed and
endowed with meaning and value through cultural activity”, with
climate being “read” in memory, behaviour, text and identity as
much as “measured through meteorology”. He further adds that
attention needs to be paid to the practices of translation through
which calculative measures of climate are produced and circulated,
whereby, “[w]eather is ﬁrst captured locally and quantiﬁed, then
transported and aggregated into regional and global indicators”,
which are then “abstracted and simulated in models before being
delivered back to their starting places (locales) in new predictive4 These cautionary remarks are signiﬁcant not least in highlighting the risks that
calculative approaches can run of reproducing a rural-urban dichotomy. Whilst per-
capita energy levels have been shown to be higher in rural areas than urban ones,
this pattern may well not be reﬂective of speciﬁcally rural characteristics. Preston
et al. (2013, p. 42), for example, have argued that rural-urban differences house-
hold carbon dioxide emissions are “modest relative to other socio-demographic
variations”, particularly income, and suggest that whilst rural domestic fuel emis-
sions are 25 per cent higher in rural areas than urban ones, such variations may be a
product of socio-economic circumstances, as well the lack of mains gas supply in
some rural areas. It is also important to recognise that there may also be important
intra-rural, and indeed, intra-urban variations. Similar cautions are made, from a
radical green perspective, by Fairlie (1996) with respect to transport emissions. He
argues, for instance, that whilst statistics relating to car ownership and use tend to
place rural populations above urban ones, signiﬁcant numbers of people “live
successfully in the countryside without regular access to cars” (p. 65), as well as
highlighting how many low income residents that were most reliant on public
transport “have been eased out of the countryside by an invasion of rich motorized
incomers” (p. 66) and suggesting that rural settlements have a much greater po-
tential to supply themselves with localised resources.and sterilised forms” (Hulme, 2008, p. 7). The reference to steri-
lisation relates to a claim that this process of translation involves a
puriﬁcation process in which “what climate means for people and
places and the relationships between people and places over time”
becomes lost through processes of abstraction, which are yet
further heightened in relation to the discourse, and associated
calculative practices, of global climate change. These construct and
disseminate the notion of a ‘globalised atmosphere’, which has but
a singular meaning, that of being a “depository for greenhouse gas
emissions” (Hulme, 2008, p. 6).
Whilst providing a series of calculative devices for representing
the future in the present, Hulme argues that this process of
abstraction creates problems in that the artefacts created appear
“distanced and un-situated” (Hulme, 2008, p. 8) relative to any
particular individual person and their everyday life. In a subsequent
study he states that climate change is “widely perceived by most
people as distant in both space and time, affecting more vulnerable
people and places elsewhere, or future generations” (Lorenzoni and
Hulme, 2009, p. 385). Similar arguments are made by Slocum
(2004, p. 413) who suggests that engaging people in climate
change mitigation and adaptation is “especially difﬁcult because
global climate change is perceived as spatially and temporally
distant”, adding in a manner that accords with the argument of
Hulme, that this should not be seen as unexpected “given that
scientists, advocates, policymakers, and constituents have con-
structed a global interpretation, vision, and community around
climate change”. Giddens (2009, p. 2) makes a similar claim, sug-
gesting that no matter howmuch people are told about the threats
a changing climate might create, it is “hard to face up to them,
because they feel somehow unreal e and, in the meantime, there is
life to be lived, with all its pleasures and pressures”.
For Giddens, this disjuncture between abstract representations
and everyday interpretations has signiﬁcant behavioural conse-
quences as it facilitates climate change becoming “a back-of-mind-
issue rather than a front-of-mind-issue” (Giddens, 2009, p. 2), with
people thereby failing to consciously transform their behaviours. A
series of studies have shown that awareness of climate change is
high, as are expressions of a willingness to take action to mitigate
its emergence (e.g. Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003; Norton and
Leaman, 2004; Poortinga et al., 2006; Upham et al., 2009;
Whitmarsh, 2009; Whitmarsh et al., 2011). However, these same
studies also indicate that much lower percentages actually under-
take these actions, a situation also observed in relation to carbon
energy use (e.g. see Upham et al., 2009; Whitmarsh et al., 2011).
Such disjunctures have been interpreted through a variety of
concepts, including the ‘attitude-behaviour gap’ (Ungar, 1994;
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra),
2005), the ‘intention-behaviour gap’ (Barr, 2004b; Barr et al.,
2006), the ‘value action gap’ (Burgess et al., 1998; Blake, 1999;
Barr, 2004a) and some variant of the ‘deﬁcit model of public un-
derstanding’ (Owens, 2000; Miller, 2001; Sturgis and Allum, 2004;
Lorenzoni et al., 2007). The last can be seen as a broader umbrella
concept encompassing aspects of the others such that lack of
knowledge, trust, experience, perceptible outcome or motivation is
seen to account for the lack of activity. The focus of such in-
terpretations often lies on accounting for these deﬁcits, with
attention concentrated on issues such as the amount and form of
information disseminated to people, the extent to which source
and mode of dissemination may inﬂuence information reception,
and the extent to which incentives or ‘nudges’ might be created to
induce closing the dissonances of stated attitudes and behaviours
(e.g. see Monroe, 2003; Moser and Dilling, 2004; Lowe et al., 2006).
Such ‘deﬁcit’ interpretations can, however, be criticised for
neglecting consideration of the material and cultural barriers, or
‘lock-ins’, that can limit behavioural implementations of intentions
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Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Nye et al., 2010); the “rich assembly of re-
actions” (Stoll-Kleemann et al., 2001, p. 107) that can surround
people’s engagement/non-engagement with mitigation and adap-
tation activities; and the degree to which people have established
imaginative constructions that pre-exist those constructed through
the calculative practices of climate change or energy ‘experts’ (see
Whitmarsh et al. (2011) on the ‘empty vessels’ assumptions of
‘deﬁcit models’).
In relation to the last argument, Nye et al. (2010) argue for the
study of on-going everyday energy use rather than a narrow focus
on the adoption of low carbon practices, whilst Hulme (2008) has
argued for research that explores how people in the course of their
everyday lives endow climate with cultural meanings, often
through practices that are quite different from the calculative
practices of climate scientists and weather forecasters. Hulme et al.
(2009, p. 200), for example, argue that people and communities
often construct understandings of climate through memories of
unusual or personally salient events or affective experiences, cur-
rent experiences and expectations about the future, and climate
related cultural norms and imagery (such as the “expectation of a
white Christmas . reiterated every festive season”), with techno-
logical changes such as the adoption of central heating also playing
a role. Geoghegan and Leyshon (2012) similarly stress the signiﬁ-
cance of ‘embodied and experiential knowledges’, suggesting that
farmers or other land managers may assess changes in climate
through the presence/absence or timing of “the extra labour of the
harvest”, or when “in the summer” they might “stop wearing .
wellies”, or through more affective practices such as “the stressful
anticipation of rain”, or indeed, no rain.
Such arguments connect to Anderson’s discussion of imagina-
tive and performative modes of practice, particularly when
conjoinedwith claims that attitudes and behaviours aremore likely
to change after involvement with imaginative and performative
interventions. O’Neil and Hulme (2009, p. 408), for example, sug-
gest that people engaged with climate change information that
they could connect to their “daily lives, local area or nature” but
were, at times, actively disengaged by expert knowledge when it
appeared to be overly complex or “invoked emotions such as
helplessness or boredom” (see also O’Neil and Nicholson-Cole,
2009). Nicholson-Cole (2005, p. 264) identiﬁed similar ﬁndings,
suggesting that people were often “more touched by national and
local imagery concerning climate change”, a ﬁnding they ascribe to
this imagery having more experiential resonance, being both easier
to cognitively relate to and also, in some cases, more emotionally
“upsetting”. She also argued that people’s understandings of
climate change were inﬂuenced by inter-personal communication
with friends and relatives, and that people often constructed highly
imaginative constructs when they were uncertain or confused.
Whilst performative and imaginative practices and associated
affective feelings may foster or discourage engagement, and
thereby behavioural change, it is important to recognise the sig-
niﬁcance of both material conditions and the complex responses
associated with interventions. In relation to the former, a series of
studies of climate change and energy conservation interventions
have detailed how behavioural changes can be induced in the
short-term but dissipate over time (Milne and Boardman, 2000;
Lowe et al., 2006; Sorrell et al., 2009). It has also been high-
lighted that interventions may not only fail to elicit any engage-
ment but can also create active rejection or hostility to the concept
being promoted: or as O’Neil and Hulme (2009) phrase it, create not
only ‘non-engagement’ but also ‘disengagement’. Such studies
highlight the need to examine the range of reactions to in-
terventions, as argued by Stoll-Kleemann et al. (2001).These reactions can be seen to encompass not only those related
to direct interventions but also responses to the more general sit-
uation identiﬁed by deﬁcit studies, namely the presence of dis-
junctures between awareness of climate change and carbon issues
and enactions of mitigation or adaptation behaviours. Within these
studies there is something of a presumption that it is only aca-
demics, policy experts and committed environmentalists that are
aware of, and concerned about, these disjunctures between
awareness and behaviour. However, Stoll-Kleemann et al. (2001)
claim that such disjunctures are widely recognised by people,
albeit in often highly complex and far from transition focused ways.
They argue, for instance, that people often make use of a range of
“psychological devices” (p. 107), or self-focused “interpretations” or
“stories” (p. 115), to resolve, deny or displace this dissonance.
Whilst the former might well involve seeking to ‘close’ the gaps
between beliefs and actions, the latter do not, instead providing
interpretations or narratives that people can use to explain to
themselves, and others, why this disjuncture exists.
Such arguments are an important addition to understanding
how people engage with the future, highlighting how engagement
and disengagement are not simply the products of the dissemina-
tion of calculative assessments or fabulations but involve emotional
and affective relations as well. As Stoll-Kleemann et al. (2001, p.
108) put it, studies need to recognise that transformations to
behaviour and lifestyle patterns are the product of more than just
discursive awareness-raising but involve “personal, social and
psychological inﬂuences that are not readily shifted around by
language or by exhortation”. Nye et al. (2010) make similar com-
ments in a review of psychological and sociological perspectives on
energy and calls for transitions in energy use, whilst Lorenzoni and
Hulme (2009) make reference to Stoll-Kleemann’s ideas in a study
that identiﬁes four distinct positions, or narratives of engagement,
with the notion climate change, ranging from the ‘engaged’who are
“worried and concerned about climate change”, through people
who express ‘doubt’ or are ‘uninterested’ in the concept, and onto
those who ‘deny’ its existence. Public discourse has tended to focus
on the two more extreme positions, as arguably has academic
discourse, although increasingly there is recognition of the need to
investigate intermediate positions, and explore not only the for-
mation, or non-formation, of engaged positions but also those of
non- or dis-engagement. Research commissioned by Defra, for
example, has identiﬁed 7 environmental attitudinal/behavioural
clusters, ranging from the ‘honestly disengaged’ through to the
‘positive greens’ via a range of intermediate positions differentiated
according to their motivation and ability to act (Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), 2008a; see also Barr
et al., 2006, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(Defra), 2006). However, despite such work, Wolsink’s (2007, p.
1199) comment that research of public attitudes towind farms have
tended to “leave the cause of opposition unexplained” can be
viewed as having more general relevance, with opposition to or
non-engagement with many forms of environmental transition
being relatively unexamined.
The issue of narratives of transition and non-transition have
clear signiﬁcance to rural studies. As alreadymentioned, calculative
practices have sought to detail how rural areas might contribute
and be impacted by energy and climate futures, but relatively little
work has been done on how people imaginatively and perform-
atively relate to such futures. It has been noted that there have been
long-standing if often over-looked ‘green radical’ imaginings of
rural futures, but as Ray and Ward (2006, p. 7) argue, dominant
rural imaginaries appear to ﬁnd it “difﬁcult . to imagine a rural
futurology” in the sense that the rural is widely deﬁned as the
“antithesis of change”. As they, and people such as Murdoch and
Pratt (1993) and Cruickshank (2009) argue, the rural is widely
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place of the pre-modern, the natural, the historic, the timeless, the
unchanging. Ray and Ward (2006, p. 8) suggest that attempts to
inject change into imaginings of the future ruralities were seen to
imply “the liquidation of the rural” as it became, in effect, viewed as
some form of urban space.
3. Anticipating futures in four English villages
Having explored anticipatory modes of practice and their rela-
tion to rural studies in general, attention nowmoves to considering
these in relation to people residing in the four villages that were the
focus of a study investigating how people in rural communities
respond to issues of climate change mitigation and adaptation. In
each village, a questionnaire-based surveywas conducted, with 194
residents over the age of 18 being interviewed across the four vil-
lages between October 2011 and May 2012.5 The questionnaires
involved open and closed questions exploring people’s everyday
practices within and beyond the settlement, their understandings
of the place inwhich they lived, and the degree towhich they could,
or could not, foresee these changing in the future. The question-
naire opened up potential for both the deployment of calculative
anticipations of the future focused on taking some “measure of the
world” (Anderson, 2010, p. 784), and also allowed a range of
imaginative and performative assessments of the potential futures
of these villages, as illustrated below.
3.1. Calculative anticipations of energy and climate futures
In relation to calculative modes of practice, for example, the
questionnaire enabled assessments of the degree to which life
within these villages was ‘carbonised’ in the sense implied by Urry
(2011, p. 16): that is, dependent on the consumption of carbon-
based energy. As outlined elsewhere (Phillips et al., 2012; Dickie
and Phillips, forthcoming; Phillips and Dickie, forthcoming), anal-
ysis indicated, for instance, that residents of the four villages
demonstrated heavy reliance on private motor vehicles, with under
3 per cent of households having no vehicle access and almost 86 per
cent of respondents stating that they had never used public
transport from their villages. It was also evident that people within
the case study villages travelled considerable distances to work
(Fig. 3), with cars also being used extensively to access a range of
resources and services (Fig. 4). In both practices, urban locations
ﬁgured strongly as the destination of travel.
The questionnaire enabled localised patterns of domestic en-
ergy use to be explored, recording, for instance, that over a quarter
of the interviewed households appeared to have domestic elec-
tricity bills of over £1000 per annum, well above the annual average
for England and Wales, which lay at £469 in 2011 (Department of
Energy and Climate Change, 2012). Despite these large energy
bills, 64 per cent of households apparently made no attempt to
monitor their energy bills, even through examination of their bills,
with 20 per cent of household respondents stating that they did not
even know roughly how much they were paying annually for
electricity. It did appear, however, that householders were seeking
to change aspects of their everyday life, environments and behav-
iours to mitigate domestic energy use: 91 per cent apparently5 The identity of the villages has not been disclosed in this paper, principally
because some of the people interviewed expressed a wish that their village not be
identiﬁed within the outputs of the project. Whilst no guarantee was made to this
effect, both because it may prove difﬁcult to sustain anonymisation even when the
identities of these villages are not given and because some participants expressed a
counter-desire, in the case of the current paper it was decided that the identity of
the villages could reasonably remain undisclosed.making use of energy-saving light bulbs, 74 per cent turning ap-
pliances off standby and 69 per cent turning their heating down to
save energy.
The questionnaire also clearly demonstrated that responses
related to contemporary energy use were regularly linked into as-
sessments of the future. Fig. 5, for example, shows that rising en-
ergy costs were an issue of concern for many households, with 56
per cent of respondents stating that theywere ‘very concerned’ that
fuel for transport would become unaffordable and a third more
being ‘fairly concerned’. This Figure also indicates that similar levels
of concern were expressed in relation to the price of domestic en-
ergy and that people were concerned about issues of national en-
ergy security of supply and reliance on public transport. Less
immediate issues relating to the longer-term availability of fossil
fuels were also in evidence, with just over a quarter of residents
stating that they were ‘very concerned’ about fossil fuels running
out and a further third stating that they were ‘slightly concerned’
about this issue.
Comparisonwith Fig. 6 suggests that levels of concern related to
future energy costs and availability were similar to expressions of
awareness about climate change, with 77 per cent of respondents
stating that they thought that the world’s climate was changing, a
ﬁgure markedly higher than the proportion of people who thought
that their village had changed physically, that their local environ-
ment was changing, or were worried about these changes. These
ﬁndings support the contention of people such as Lorenzoni and
Hulme (2009) and Slocum (2004, p. 413) that climate change is
often seen as something abstract that does not impact on people’s
local environment, although in contrast to these studies, it was
found that 78 per cent of the people who thought that climate
change was occurring also thought that the UK was already expe-
riencing its impacts.
As previously discussed, the distancing of climate change from
local contexts has been associated with disjunctures betweenFig. 3. Places of work of residents of 4 case study villages.
Fig. 4. Distance travelled to access basic commodities and services.
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pronouncements of climate change scientists, and between stated
expressions of concern about climate change and the adoption of
climate change mitigation and adaptation practices. Both disjunc-
tures were evidenced in the study villages. Reference, for example,
has already been made to the lack of monitoring of energy con-
sumption amongst the people interviewed, despite clear expres-
sions of concern about energy prices. Similarly, despite seemingly
widespread expressions of concern about climate change, as Fig. 7
illustrates, many of the residents interviewed were seemingly
unengaged with, or indeed even contemplating, many carbon- and
energy-reducing activities, even though many undertook other
environmentally friendly activities such as recycling. Furthermore,
when residents were asked about how other people in the village
thought about climate change, there were repeated responses
indicating that the issue of climate change was rarely, if ever,
expressed within everyday conversations in the village:Fig. 5. Levels of future“I wouldn’t have a clue. It’s not a thing that tends to come up in
conversation very often”;
“Don’t think they do [think about climate change] really, I was
just thinking, whenwe did the community plan nobody raised it
as an issue”;
“think to most people it’s the elephant in the room. It’s one of
those things that everyone knows about but no one really talks
about”.
This lack of everyday discussion indicates that climate change
was far from the normative inﬂuence on attitudes and behaviour
that, say, recycling has become in the UK (see Barr, 2004a,b; Barr
and Gilg, 2007). Despite awareness of the risks of climate change
it very much appears to remain an absent presence in everyday
anticipatory reﬂections.energy concerns.
Fig. 6. Environmental awareness and concern.
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weather or environmental conditions. Figs. 8 and 9, for example,
indicate that many respondents clearly perceived that there had
been change in both climate and environmental conditions over the
previous 5e10 years, although there was considerable variation in
the changes identiﬁed, stemming at least in part because people’s
interpretations of change were, as suggested by the likes of Hulme
(2008) and Hulme et al. (2009), clearly connected to memories of
unusual, personally salient or affective experiences:
“we’ve had snow but prior to that I’ve brought up 2 children
who are now in their 30s and the toboggan was never got
out but it would have done in the last 10 years or the last 5
years”;Fig. 7. Engagement with en“I don’t have all the facts and ﬁgures and charts and temperature
. I go on how many times I have to break the ice in the water
bucket, I’m sort of in tune with climate but I can’t say it’s any
more or, people say the winter’s getting warmer, but in the 70s
we’d get those heat waves”.
Such interpretations illustrate the imaginative and performative
ways inwhich residents engage with issues of climate change, with
the disjunctures between these everyday interpretations and the
calculative ones of climate change scientists not being one of simple
disengagement but rather one of alternative modes of practice.
Furthermore it was clear that Leyshon and Geoghegan’s (2012, p.
240) claim that climate change is a term that is ‘pervaded’ byvironmental activities.
Fig. 8. Observed changes in local weather conditions over preceding decade.
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nate clearly with the responses of many of the villages being
studied. There were, for example, numerous seemingly highly
contradictory assertions about the climate, as well as clear evidence
of ambiguity and uncertainty:
“I’m in two minds about climate change and the rising of sea
levels: it’s either going to happen or scientists are scare mon-
gering and it’s not going to happen in which case it’ll be much
the same as it was before”.
Uncertainty and contradictory viewpointswere also verymuch in
evidence in discussions of energy options, as well as quite strident
voicesof support andopposition to renewable energydevelopments:
“I’ve nothing against turbines but I don’t know how efﬁcient
they are, some people say they’re efﬁcient and others don’t, so I
don’t really know about those too much”;Fig. 9. Observed changes in garden and villag“The only threat we have at the moment is the bloody wind
farms they are trying to put in. I am very much against it . It
won’t spoil my view at all but they are so, the whole country is
broke and they are wasting money. The bloody politicians are
wasting money on these fanciful ideas”;
“There’s lots of people very opposed to them but they don’t
bother me to much extent. They are using natural energy aren’t
they and if you watch them they are quite fascinating . . I’d
like solar power but I can’t afford it”.
The presence of uncertainty has been viewed as an important
contributor to the disjuncture between expressions of concern and
the adoption of mitigation and adaptation practices: Lorenzoni
et al. (2007, p. 452), for example, argue that many people in Brit-
ain are “ambivalent about the reality and severity of climate
change” feeling that the “scientiﬁc evidence was unreliable,
incomplete, conﬂicting; and because they were aware of politicale conditions over preceding 5e10 years.
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cates of deﬁcit models of public understanding tend to respond by
arguing for more clarity and certainty in the communication of
climate change calculative predictions and the use of more imagi-
natively centred forms of representation. However, such ap-
proaches can be criticised for presentingmisleading puriﬁcations of
knowledge, as well as continuing to neglect detailed consideration
of the content and formation of everyday understandings of issues
such as climate change.
Overall, the questionnaire based calculative practices have
conﬁrmed that life for the majority of residents in the study villages
was heavily carbonised, and also that there was widespread
anticipatory concern about future energy prices and availability,
plus a broadly similar level of anticipation of climate change. In
relation to both energy and climate change there was, however,
considerable uncertainty and differences in opinion over the form
and causes of future change and/or the mitigative or adaptive re-
sponses that could/should be adopted. Such contestation and un-
certainty may well have contributed to a disjuncture between
anticipatory concerns andmitigative/adaptive actions that was also
strongly evidenced though the calculative practices of the ques-
tionnaire, although such practices may themselves be in disjunc-
tionwith everyday imaginative norms and performances. However,
as will be argued in the next section there may well be more to the
formation of such disjunctures than the presence of ambiguity and
uncertainty.7 Given that these narratives emerged a posteriori to the questionnaire rather
than were an a priori focus, it is not possible to establish a comprehensive quan-
titative assessment of their relative signiﬁcance. This is because they emerged only
when people chose to provide evaluative/justiﬁcatory/legitimatory accounts in3.2. Narratives of transition and stasis
One important facet of examining people’s imaginative and
performative anticipatory actions is considering how they incor-
porate responses to apparent disjunctures between expressions of
concern and action, and indeed between expert calculative pre-
dictions and people’s everyday anticipatory reﬂections. As dis-
cussed previously, Stoll-Kleemann et al. (2001) argue that people
are often highly aware of such dissonances and seek to deal with
them using a range of psychological devices, including self-
justifying narratives.6
Drawing on this suggestion, attentionwas paid to the arguments
that people were presenting in accounting for their interpretations
of rural futures and the role that issues such as climate change and
carbon dependency might play in these. These arguments emerged
as transcriptions of responses to the open questions questionnaires
were analysed using code-and-retrieve methods carried out using
NVivo, an approach which Wiles et al. (1995, p. 90) argue is widely
adopted by researchers seeking to “capture the pluralism and
polyvocality of lived experience”. They further argue that such
features can lead researchers into the analysis of narratives, which
might minimally include “closely examining how a story is told
within an interview, or how the interview itself unfolds as a kind of
narrative” (Wiles et al., 1995, p. 92). In the present context, the
former focus, which might be described as a ‘paradigmatic analysis
of prosaic narratives’ (Polkinghorne, 1995; Smeyers and6 The concept of narrative is both simple and complex, being used in the former
sense to refer to situations that seem to involve people ‘telling stories’ that are, as
Wiles et al. (2005) note, minimally seen as involving a sequence of connected
events or situations. Wiles et al., however, identify a series of other aspects of
narratives, including that narratives can be viewed as “both a mode of represen-
tation and a mode of reasoning”, being a mechanism by which people “learn about,
explain and organize experience” that is particularly signiﬁcant “with respect to
difﬁcult and intense emotional concepts” (p. 90, original emphasis). This last
feature is signiﬁcant in the present context given that the studies of Stoll-Kleemann
et al. (2001) and Lorenzoni and Hulme (2009) both emphasise affective dimensions
of engagement and non-/dis-engagement.Verhesschen, 2001), was adopted. Within this, the code-and-
retrieve methodology was focused upon the identiﬁcation and
analysis of interview segments which involved more than simple
reportage of views, events or practices but included attempts to tell
a story about them, in the sense the interviewee took responsibility
for “making the relevance of the telling clear” (Polanyi, 1985, p. 13).
In other words, the interviewee went beyond reportage to provide
some elements of evaluation, justiﬁcation or legitimation for the
views, events or practices they were describing.
The code and retrieve method was used to not only identify
“brief stories within . each interview” but also “larger overall
narratives” that emerged sequentially through the course of in-
terviews and as common elements could be identiﬁed across in-
terviews (Mills, 2001, p. 298). In the context of rural futures, eight
such narratives were identiﬁed, which broadly fell into two
groups.7
The ﬁrst group of narratives was ones of stasis, or non-
transition, whereby people provided arguments as to why they,
and/or others, would not change. One of the strongest of these
narratives was one of ‘can’t see or imagine change’, whereby people
claimed that change was not apparent or conceivable. This narra-
tive often drew upon notions of rurality, which as previously dis-
cussed, has been widely represented as the antithesis of change,
being variously characterized as a place of the pre-modern, the
natural, the historic, the timeless and the unchanging. Whilst we
are not suggesting that such a narrative of not being able to imagine
or conceive of change cannot exist in urban or suburban areas, it
was evident that notions of the rural as some anti-thesis of change
were indeed widely enacted in interviews with residents of the
case study villages:
“I would still describe it as a village, and when I have deﬁned it
as a village I mean it has a core, there is the community around
the church/village pub. I don’t think if you went back to 1980,
even post-war, here, I don’t think there’s really been a great deal
of change. There has been some property development, [but]
the pub was there, the church was there, probably there was a
post ofﬁce and a village stores. I don’t envisage there being
signiﬁcant change. [nor that] between now and 40 years time
that [this] would dramatically change, and I think the kind of
environment that people live in [here]. will [not make them]
want to signiﬁcantly change things. cities and large towns will
change much more. The strong communal identity of village
life is such that there is an in built reluctance to change”;
“I don’t think the village will change too much. I’m trying to
think at what changes really could happen . individual prop-
erties may change a little, but really, nothing much gonna
happen”;response to open questions rather than there being explicit questions requiring
such responses. It is also clear that the narratives were not mutually exclusive, with
some residents expressing elements of more than one narrative. For these reasons,
and to stress the connections of these narratives to imaginative and performative
modes of anticipatory action, the focus in this paper is on presenting the content of
some of the stories presented to the research team in the interviews. In line with
the emphasis on ‘capturing the pluralism and polyvocality of lived experience’, the
content of these narrative will be presented through a series of illustrative quotes
that we feel both ‘give voice’ to some of people that were interviewed as well as
provide a ‘thick description’ as to the forms of argument being presented (see
Geertz, 1973 for elaboration of these concepts and their value to qualitative
research, and also Cloke et al., 2004). Clearly there are other forms of analysis and
presentation of narratives that could have been adopted, including ones that make
greater use of more quantitative descriptions.
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houses but not many . I mean if you do it in reverse, let’s go
back 30 years, what the difference? Not much”.
A second, also widespread, narrative of stasis was that the need
for or direction of changewas uncertain, so inactionwas reasonable
until greater certainty was evident. The presence of uncertainties
over particular technologies and climate change has already been
highlighted, and it was clear that such features fed into accounts of
why actions were not being taken to mitigate or adapt to climate
change or energy challenges:
“I’ve seen really compelling arguments . that shows almost
irrefutable evidence of it [climate change] yet I am also aware of
some really smart people who are saying that it is not that cut
and dried. naturally it will change but we are also inﬂuencing
it”;
“The evidence is out on wind power. If there is evidence that
wind farms are really making an impact I think I would be
supportive”.
Such accounts bear similarities with Lorenzoni and Hulme’s
(2009) identiﬁcation of a ‘doubting’ attitude to climate change,
although issues of uncertainty and doubt clearly also extended to a
series of other issues including the value of particular forms of
renewable energy production.
As previously noted, Lorenzoni and Hulme (2009) also identify
an attitude of denial, whereby people explicitly reject arguments
about climate change, considering that it either is not happening or
likely to happen, or if it is, it will not signiﬁcantly impact either
them or other people. Such views are characteristic of the ‘honestly
disengaged’ cluster identiﬁed in Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) (2008a) and, as has already been
illustrated, were often expressed very vocally by some case study
interviewees. Hence a third narrative was that of non-transition
because of an explicit rejection of calls for change.
A fourth narrative of stasis was centred around a desire to
simply keep things as they are, which can be seen to be a variant of
Lorenzoni and Hulme’s (2009) ‘uninterested’ category of response
that corresponds closely with Stoll-Kleemann et al.’s (2001, p. 107)
identiﬁcation of a ‘comfort interpretation’ of inactivity. Within this
narrative people may appear to be more content with their current
situation than with prospects of having to change. It was very clear
in the current study that many residents had invested materially
and psychologically in their current place of residence and lifestyle
and did not wish to see this being changed:
“truthful answer, I don’t want to think about it . I think there
will be some huge changes and I hope there won’t be”;
“I hope prettymuch the same, I fear that the village could lose its
identity. I think it would be bigger, I hope not this area, if that
happened I wouldn’t be here”;
“Oh God, there will be solar panels everywhere, everything will
be shining, all the rooftops will be shining, and there will be
wind turbines I would imagine, if not small ones in people’s
gardens therewill deﬁnitely be big ones surrounding the village,
all around us. Oh my God, I don’t want to [imagine it], I don’t
know, it’s just makes me feel sad, I don’t know, I worry, I just
worry”.
A ﬁfth narrative was one in which people were quite accepting
of the notion of some form of transition being needed, but could not
see how they personally could change, or effect the required level of
change:“Making fewer car journeys is personally impossible, and I don’t
think you can buy food with less packaging, it’s up to the
supermarket”;
“I try not to concern myself with things I cannot inﬂuence. If I
thought I could do something about it I would worry”;
“Obviously human causes contribute to the heating up but .
we’ve had cars for hundred odd years and there’s, what, 50
million of us. Chinese have 1000 years of riding round on bi-
cycles, millions of those start driving Range Rovers around the
place it’s going to have a far bigger impact than England
switching off my tea to standby, it’s just not going to make any
sniff of a difference globally”.
Such accounts can be seen to accord to some of the attitudes and
views expressed by people classiﬁed as ‘stalled starters’, ‘cautious
participants’ or ‘sideline supporters’ in Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) (2008a), and they
exhibit at least three of the four “closely interlinked in-
terpretations” of denial identiﬁed by Stoll-Kleemann et al. (2001, p.
112), namely an unwillingness to give up customary habits and
favoured lifestyles (the ‘comfort interpretation’ mentioned above);
claims of a disjuncture between personal costs and public beneﬁts,
with the former outweighing the latter; and calls to the power of
technology and state regulation to solve the problems of the future,
perspectives clearly enacted in the following account by a rural
resident addressing their concerns and actions with respect to
energy and climate futures:
“I am concerned but I think it is in the gift of the government to
do something about it. they will come up with something, the
technology is there, the oil companies just don’t want to press
the go button”.
The ﬁve narratives of stasis outlined above were very wide-
spread in the case study villages, perhaps unsurprising given the
level of mitigation and adaptation activities previously docu-
mented. They were also often intertwined in people’s accounts of
their imaginings of rural futures and their associated anticipatory
actions in the present, or their accounts as towhy such actions were
not being undertaken. There were, however, also people who
adopted more transitional narratives, with at least three being
clearly identiﬁable.
First, there were clearly some people who seemed to hold the
view that change was simply inevitable, a view that often con-
structed rural areas as places that were in effect inescapably at the
mercy of much wider forces of change:
“The only thing we can say about the future is that it’ll be
different to what it is now. [Even] if there’s no climate change I
think there’s. going to a be a need for more housing. I think
that’s inevitable, if there’s more people there’s going to be more
houses and they’re going to expand the existing areas of housing
rather than start a completely new town somewhere”;
“I think inevitably there is going to be some development on
green belt land”;
“I think it’ll be the same in 8 years and then I think after 2020,
when these farmers have died off and their sons have taken
over, then the conglomerates will be buying the land and so you
won’t have the community because they’ll just come in with
contractors.. [O]nce the conglomerates take over they’ll want
all the land, they’ll amalgamate ﬁelds. so they can use bigger
machines because the machines are huge. Yes I think the ﬁelds
will get bigger and . I don’t think there’ll be much beef
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don’t think it will be like it is now”.
In such accounts change was not necessarily welcomed, but
seen as something that would simply have to be accepted or
accommodated in some way or another, a viewpoint clearly artic-
ulated by a resident in one of the Lincolnshire villages:
“If it’s going to ﬂood, it’s going to ﬂood, I was herewhen the East
Coast ﬂooded in 1953 . [B]y today’s costs, it was billions and
billions of pounds put into creating a ﬂoodwall . well they
should have let it go, you know, and moved everybody because
it’s just costing too much. I think if it’s going to ﬂood, let it ﬂood
and move somewhere else”.
A second set of narratives of transition could be described as
utopian in that they foresaw that change might make existing
conditions better, even though they themselves might not neces-
sarily be advocates of such change8:
“I guess it might be more self-sustainable, I think that might be
the way things might go. it will be more efﬁcient I hope, efﬁ-
cient in terms of energy production”;
“I think we need to ensure that the village doesn’t become
fossilised, we need more young people with young families. I
don’t think it will become an idyllic village with a Midsomer
Murders setting because it is too mixed and I like the economic
mix as well as the rural mix”;
“we’re relatively progressive thinking family, so things have to
change basically, you can’t sit in the same houses and same way
for ever”.
Finally, there were people who were quite explicitly arguing for
change related to climate change. These people, who might be
variously characterised, at least in terms of attitudes and behav-
iours, as the ‘engaged’ (Lorenzoni and Hulme, 2009) or the ‘positive
greens’ (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(Defra), 2008a), were in a clear minority in the study. They were,
however, often very articulate and passionate about the need for
action and change:
“We do try andmake fewer car journeys, we do all our shopping
and various things in Louth, well we try and do that once aweek,
rather than going in every few days for stuff. . We avoid
packaging like the plague, we buy fresh food, we have a policy in
our family where we try and buy as locally grown as possible,
during summer we grow as much as we can ourselves. . We
recycle virtually everything we can. We make the house as eco
as well we can in a 300 year old house, we have deliberately not
bought things like dishwashers and tumble driers and we only
have one telly, we don’t have a microwave”;
“my concerns are mainly to do with the future, I worry myself
sick . I have arguments about everything, like, for instance, I
am an eco-queen, I have recycled for years, I have recycled when
Leicester didn’t do it, I hated the fact that there was these8 There is a potential link here to notions of altruistic values as discussed in an
environmental context by Stern et al. (1995), Gilg et al. (2005) and Barr and Gilg
(2006, 2007). However, the notion of utopianism is preferred here, as it arguably
does not imply the notion of self-disinterest implied by the notion of altruism.
Furthermore, whilst it is argued in the text that enactments of utopian narratives
might not necessarily involve direct promotion of change this does not preclude
that such narratives might, in some instances, come to motivate action.landﬁlls and England being a country that’s not very big and
everyone just dumps so we’ve got mountains and mountains of
everything . Regardless of what the outcome may or may not
be, do you not think even if you did recycle and you cut back on
energy consumption and your water consumption, that at the
end it would always be good regardless of what the outcome is.
It’s a good thing and so I have, you know, I do get a real bee inmy
bonnet on many aspects”.
4. Conclusion
This article has explored how the residents in four English vil-
lages engage with the future of their locations of residence in the
course of their everyday lives. It has drawn on claims that the future
is an important, if hitherto rather unexamined presence in the
contemporary present. Rural studies provide a clear illustration of
this in that although there have been a series of future orientated
rural studies extending back over many decades, these appear
marginal to the mass of past and present focused research, a situ-
ation that arguably reﬂects the signiﬁcance of stasis in many
imaginings of the English countryside. Having said this, Matless
(1990, 1994; 1998) has clearly demonstrated that many texts
interpreted as espousing anti-modernist preservationist resistance
to change can often, under detailed examination, be read as actually
promoting particular forms of change. Such divergent in-
terpretations suggest that more attention needs to be paid to
constructions of change and stasis within and beyond the coun-
tryside, particularly given claims that the contemporary present is a
‘geohistorical moment’ in which issues of transition and the ques-
tions over the nature of the future are especially prominent. It is
clear that issues of transition and stasis have become of wide-
spread, if arguably still of under-acknowledged signiﬁcance, within
studies of and discourses on the countryside, both in England and
elsewhere.
These studies and discourses clearly extend beyond academic
texts, with Ward and Ray (2004) highlighting how the UK Gov-
ernment became increasingly engaged in rural future studies in the
mid-1990s, whilst Whitmarsh (2011) has highlighted how issues of
climate change became an object of Governmental concern in the
early 2000s. Whilst climate change is an issue extending beyond
rural areas, there are grounds for suggesting that it is important for
rural communities to consider it, not least because Governmental
and other studies have suggested that these areas exhibit high per
capita levels of carbon energy consumption and greenhouse gas
emissions. Furthermore, rural areas are favoured sites for many
forms of low carbon energy production as well as valuable carbon
sinks. Given this, it is unsurprising that reports by organisations
such as the Commission for Rural Communities began to evaluate the
role of rural areas within climate change formation and mitigation,
as well as the potential impacts of climate change on rural
communities.
Many of these evaluations have taken the form of empirical-
analytical analyses and hence fall within Anderson’s (2010) cal-
culative mode of making futures present. This study has engaged
in aspects of such practice, presenting some calculative assess-
ments of carbon dependency amongst residents of four villages
located in three contrasting areas of England. These assessments
have produced ﬁgures that support many existing interpretations
of the signiﬁcance for rural residents of carbon-based private
travel and their high levels of domestic energy use, much of which
is again carbon-based. It was also apparent that some residents in
these villages were themselves undertaking calculative assess-
ments as to the future viability of their current patterns of energy
use, particularly with regard to travel costs. However, many people
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own domestic consumption levels, and there was little mitigative
or adaptive actions related to concerns of energy futures.
A similar lack of mitigative or adaptive actions was evident in
relation to climate change, albeit in this case there was little
engagement in personal calculative assessments although aware-
ness of such assessments made by government agencies and climate
scientistswaswidespread. This study, likemany others, details that a
clear majority of people expressed general acceptance of climate
change assessments, although thiswas accompanied neither by high
levels of understanding or mitigative/adaptive actions. Whilst such
disjunctures have been widely interpreted via some deﬁcit model,
this study has sought to develop an interpretation that explores the
degree to which they reﬂect the presence of imaginative and
performative constructions of climate change and energy, as well as
material and cultural relations that limit actions and narratives to
the self that act to resolve, deny or displace dissonances between
beliefs and actions. The study identiﬁes ﬁve such narratives as well
as three narratives of transition that were employed with signiﬁ-
cantly less frequency within the case study villages.
The presence and strength of narratives of stasis, along with the
evidence of highly carbonised lifestyles, suggest that there are
major challenges in facilitating transitions towards low carbon
rural futures. The arguments advanced in this paper imply that
addressing these challenges does not simply require the estab-
lishment and/or greater dissemination of ever more rigorous
empirical-analytical studies of plausible/probable futures. Such
studies might make the future more clearly present in the present,
thereby reducing some of the uncertainties that this study has
demonstrated often act to provide a rationale for present inactivity
with respect to mitigative or adaptive actions. However, the degree
to which uncertainty reduction is possible is a complex issue given
claims that the very notion of climate change is saturated with high
levels of uncertainty. Attention therefore needs to be paid to
whether there is scope for encouraging responses to uncertainty
that are other than ‘inactivity until the trends of the future make
themselves evident in the present with a reasonable degree of
certainty’, by which time there might be, as emphasised by Giddens
in his self-entitled paradox, little or no scope for creating any
alternative futures. Anderson (2010), for example, highlights how
the ‘precautionary principle’ has been widely promoted as an
anticipatory logic because of its recognition of uncertainty.
Notions of alternative futures also potentially embrace issues of
uncertainty, although as discussed in this article, endeavours to
construct plausible or probable futures can be seen to reduce this
by restricting futures to re-runs of past and present presences. By
contrast, this article has promoted the notion of future fabulations,
which are based around imaginings of worlds that contain desires
that are absences from the present. Such imaginings could
encompass the raft of radical ruralities discussed by Halfacree
(2007), although these have hitherto been largely excluded from
rural future works which, even whilst making use of creative vis-
ualisations, often remain ﬁrmly anchored to the contours of past
and present worlds. An important area of future work is, we would
argue, to encourage engagement with fabulations of potential other
worlds, both by researchers and people within or with govern-
mental responsibilities for rural communities.
Such work is arguably of particular signiﬁcance in rural contexts
given that, at least within the four English villages studied here,
there were signiﬁcant numbers of people ﬁnding it difﬁcult to
conceive or imagine change within rural spaces. This inability
encompassed past, present and future, with there being repeated
claims that rural areas had remained unchanged from the past and
would remain the same into the future. Such views may reﬂect the
biographies of people’s engagement with rural space, as well as thesigniﬁcance of stasis in many representations of the English
countryside, with recent migrants to the countryside clearly having
less extensive experiences of this space from which to make their
assessments. Further areas of potential research would hence to be
explore how attitudes to change may reﬂect migrational histories,
whether greater awareness of past changes impacts on people’s
anticipatory assessments and images of the future, and whether
empirical-analytical predictions and/or creative fabulations can
alter people’s ability and willingness to imagine other futures.
Uncertainty is not the sole reason given for disjunctures between
acceptance of climate change and energy as objects of future
concern and mitigative/adaptive actions. which in various ways act
to make the future present in the present as well as account for a
person’s activity or inactivity. Indeed, whilst the thrust of work by
people such as Anderson (2010) has been on how the future is made
present in the present, Jones et al. (2012, p. 262) have recently
argued that attention should also be paid to the range of “processes
that keep absences absent”. Many of the narratives of stasis can
indeed be seen as being ways to make futures absent from the
present. The narratives of ‘denial’ and ‘keep things as they are’, for
example, both seek to keep absent from the present future concerns
related to climate change and energy shortage. They do this, how-
ever, in quite different ways: in the ﬁrst instance by direct rejection
of anticipations of such futures, whilst in the second a focus on the
present is used to displace future concerns. The narratives of ‘can’t
see change’ or ‘change is so uncertain’ also serve to displace some
future concerns although the future is still a highly active presence
within these narratives. Attempts to shift behaviours in relation to
climate change and low carbon transitions, we would suggest, need
to take seriously theway these, and no doubt other, narratives to the
self make certain futures both present and absent.References
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